The Paradox of Myanmar's Regime Change by Roger Lee Huang

Author:Roger Lee Huang [Huang, Roger Lee]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, International Relations, Arms Control, Social Science, Ethnic Studies, American, Asian American Studies, Regional Studies, Young Adult Nonfiction, Politics & Government
ISBN: 9781000063585
Google: TODaDwAAQBAJ
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2020-04-06T01:41:52+00:00

ASEAN’s limitations

ASEAN may have allowed greater political representation and a platform for Myanmar to engage in international diplomacy; however, their collective attempt to “socialize” Myanmar appeared to have made little impact in Myanmar’s domestic politics (Chow and Easley 2016: 532–533). In part, ASEAN has long publicly advocated a policy of non-interference in the sovereignty of other states, at least when it suited their national interests. The majority of ASEAN’s political establishment were also skeptical about expanded socio-political pluralism within their own regimes, which did not have the best track records in affording their citizens greater civil and political rights. ASEAN’s “ideological conservatism” emphasizes on regional cohesion and stability, with little interest in changing the status quo (Jones 2008: 288). ASEAN states therefore have consistently rejected sanctions as an option to pressure Myanmar. Despite misgivings about Myanmar, ASEAN has continued to back the country in the face of international criticisms. For example, all ten ASEAN members boycotted the 2005 economic ministers’ Asia-Europe Meeting in Rotterdam after the Netherlands refused to issue visas to the Myanmar delegation (Egreteau and Jagan 2013: 179). Even on rare occasions where ASEAN has moved away from its general adherence to non-interference in individual states’ domestic affairs, the public outcry has not been followed-up with any concrete actions. ASEAN has instead pushed consistently for the UN to take the lead by backing UN appointed special envoys to facilitate talks (Jones 2008: 285).

However, as a way of deflecting international criticism against ASEAN’s unwillingness to confront Myanmar’s worst behaviors, ASEAN has repeatedly appealed to the junta to embrace political reforms. These efforts have, however, generally revolved around national reconciliation in relation to the role of Aung San Suu Kyi – either calling for her release during different bouts of her house arrest or for political dialogues. The junta has rarely made any meaningful concessions to these demands, and more critically, since the introduction of its seven-step roadmap, it has not diverged from the political direction nor accelerated the pace of its implementation.

During the junta’s 23-year rule, three critical events – the 2003 Depayin Massacre, the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007, and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis – have led to intensified responses from the international community. In each case, ASEAN has taken a much more visible and assertive approach in addressing the perceived failings of the junta. Nevertheless, despite the public rhetoric, these were in effect moderate reactions to extraordinary events. In none of these cases, was there any evidence that the junta felt sufficiently threatened to amend its policies. Even after the near universal condemnation of its actions, the junta remain united and made no changes to the way the regime governed its disciplined society.

In May 2002, the junta released Aung San Suu Kyi from her second bout of house arrest, ostensibly as a response to the visits of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail, a top Malaysian diplomat. However, if this was a response to appease ASEAN and other international actors, the alleged overture was soon reversed by the junta.

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